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RULE 10b-5 AND THE GENERAL LAW AS TO DECEIT IN
SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS IN MARYLAND
*HERBERT M. BRUNE
The law as to deceit and fraud, or constructive fraud, in the
purchase and sale of securities has been significantly changed in
recent years by a mushrooming growth of federal case law inter-
preting and applying rule 10b-51 of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. As will be shown, that rule, promulgated in 1942,
gives legal force to certain obligations of fair dealing which had
only moral sanction prior to its adoption.
The far-reaching nature of this development and its signifi-
cance for the local bar, in Maryland and in every other state, are
exemplified by the fact that at this time more than twenty cases
arising under the rule, chiefly involving Maryland corporations
and enterprises, are pending in the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland.2 In most, if not all, of these cases
the issues raise both new or unsettled questions under the rule as
well as a complex of questions which require a reconsideration
and application of state jurisprudence in light of the federal rule.
Under the Maryland common law, as developed in past
years, a plaintiff alleging fraud or deceit in a securities transac-
tion, absent some special fiduciary relationship, was obliged in
order to qualify for relief to show an intentional misrepresen-
tation, or one made with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity;3
* Partner, Brune & Robertson, Baltimore, Maryland; A.B., 1922, Williams College;
J.D., 1925, Harvard University. Author of MARYLAND CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE
(Rev. ed. 1953).
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973) [rule 10b-5 hereinafter referred to in text as "the
rule"]. The rule was promulgated under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act [15
U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970)], as rule X-10b-5, on May 21, 1942, and published in the Federal
Register the following day. 7 Fed. Reg. 3804 (1942). For a complete history and background
of the rule see 1 A. BROMBERG, SEcUrrmEs LAW: FRAuD 3-58 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
A. BROMBERG].
2. Many of these cases will be referred to in the following article. A rough estimate,
based on comparative population, would indicate that the national case load in this field
may exceed one thousand suits.
3. Schmidt v. Millhauser, 212 Md. 585, 130 A.2d 572 (1957); Cahill v. Applegarth,
98 Md. 493, 56 A. 794 (1904).
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however, broadly speaking, rule 10b-5 imposes a duty on all who
have superior pertinent information, requiring them to make only
truthful statements and to disclose any material information be-
fore entering into a securities transaction, whether purchase or
sale.4 Few, if any, of the cases decided under the common law
conception will retain probative force under the new conditions
governing litigation pursuant to rule 10b-5.1
The rule, however, did not spring fully developed from the
heads of a few persons in charge of policy at the Commission, but
was foreshadowed by both common law and statutory precedent.
Earlier state and federal cases had asserted the existence of a
fiduciary obligation owed by persons in control of a corporation
toward other stockholders having inadequate sources of informa-
tion. On the basis of fiduciary duty, a general obligation of disclo-
sure of pertinent facts was imposed on informed and controlling
stockholders if they sought to purchase from, or sell to, minority
stockholders, stock or other securities of the corporation.'
The statutory precursor of rule 10b-5 was the Securities Act
of 1933.1 The anti-fraud provisions of that act were largely con-
fined to the protection of buyers rather than sellers of securities,8
and were particularly intended for those persons who were unin-
formed and unsophisticated as to securities transactions. Such
persons had invested heavily in securities during the speculative
period of the late 1920's, and many had lost their entire capital
in the market collapse and great depression which extended from
1929 to 1932. The catastrophic effect of these speculations called
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973). For the wording of the rule see note 15 infra and
accompanying text.
5. The broader duty of disclosure now recognized under the rule promises to have a
more far-reaching and encompassing effect than the earlier cases on deceit.
6. See, e.g., MacGill v. MacGill, 135 Md. 384, 109 A. 72 (1919). See also Clapp, A
Fiduciary's Duty of Loyalty, 3 MD. L. REv. 221, 234-35 (1939). An earlier case decided in
the same year as MacGill recognized a similar obligation of disclosure of material facts
by directors who arranged for their corporation to sell a large block of stock without
advising the purchaser that they held certain obligations of the company. McGaw v. Hoen,
133 Md. 672, 106 A. 13 (1919).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970).
8. These anti-fraud provisions are: section 11 [15 U.S.C. § 77k] which imposes
liability for a materially misleading or defective registration statement; section 12(1) [15
U.S.C. § 771(1)] which imposes liability on anyone who offers or sells a security in viola-
tion of the registration requirements of the Act; section 12(2) [15 U.S.C. § 771(2)] which
imposes liability on anyone who offers or sells a security by means of a material misstate-
ment or omission; and, section 17(a) [15 U.S.C. § 77q] which makes unlawful any form
of fraud, untruth or omission of a material fact, with respect to the sale of any securities
in interstate commerce or by use of the mails. See 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1423,
1684 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as L. Loss].
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for national legislation to prevent a recurrence, and thus led to
the adoption of the Securities Act which, as stated, was couched
in such terms as to protect defrauded buyers Chief among these
provisions was section 17(a) of the Act, which declared illegal (in
terms similar to those to be restated in rule 10b-5) the obtaining
of money or property through the sale of securities to a buyer by
means of misrepresentation of a material fact or omission to dis-
close a material fact;'0 however, neither section 17(a) nor any
other provision of the Securities Act of 1933 contained a parallel
provision for the protection of a seller of securities induced to
make the sale by a similar misrepresentation or omission.
When the Securities Exchange Act was enacted in 1934," the
Commission was given authority to correct this imbalance. Sec-
tion 10(b) of the Exchange Act authorized the Commission to
adopt rules and regulations condemning the use of "any manipu-
lative or deceptive device or contrivance . . . in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security . . . in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe."'" Pur-
suant to this authorization, the Commission adopted rule 10b-5,
which specifically applies to purchases as well as sales of securi-
ties, and appears to afford the first clear statutory basis for fede-
ral relief to a defrauded seller.'3 Summarizing the foregoing, pro-
tection has developed chronologically, first, for buyers who had
been misled and could employ the Securities Act, and, secondly,
for defrauded sellers, under the rule adopted pursuant to the later
Exchange Act."
9. "The purpose of the [1933] Act is to protect the naive or uninformed investor
and to deny recourse to the reckless or fraudulent seller of securities." Can-Am Petroleum
Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d 371, 373 (10th Cir. 1964).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970). See also 3 L. Loss, supra note 8, at 1423.
11. Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 [codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.
(1970)].
12. 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973). See also L. Loss, supra note 8, at 1427.
14. Due to this historical development the new rule was at first regarded as designed
only for the protection of defrauded sellers. In this connection, the occasion of promulga-
tion of the rule is of interest, for the particular case brought to the Commission's attention
was one involving minority stockholders who were persuaded by the president of the
company to sell their shares to him. See statement of Milton Freeman, Conference on
Codification of the Federal Securities Law, 22 Bus. LAWYER 793, 922 (1967). The speaker
was a staff attorney of the SEC in 1942, and learned of a call from the Regional Admin-
istrator in Boston, advising that the president of a company there "is going around buying
up the stock of his company at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that the
company is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quadrupled
and will be $2.00 a share for this coming year. Is there anything we can do about it?" Id.
This led to a study of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act in connection with section 17 of
1973]
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The rule as adopted by the Commission under section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act of 1934, provides, in essence, that in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails, or of any facility of a national securities exchange, (1)
to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) to
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in any act,
practice or course of business which operates or would oper-
ate as a fraud or deceit upon any person."
The position of an injured seller under the new rule was
particularly stressed in a much-quoted passage of Judge Leahy in
the 1951 case of Speed v. Transamerica Corp. ,"8 where he said:
It is unlawful for an insider, such as a majority stockholder,
to purchase the stock of minority stockholders without dis-
closing material facts affecting the value of the stock, known
to the majority stockholder by virtue of his inside position
but not known to the selling minority stockholders, which
information would have affected the judgment of the sellers.
The duty of disclosure stems from the necessity of preventing
a corporate insider from utilizing his position to take unfair
advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders. 7
Generally speaking, the cases under the rule fall largely into
two major categories-specific wrongs against individual persons
committed by those who deal directly with them, and general
the Securities Act, and according to Mr. Freeman they "put them together" as a draft
for the Commission. All the Commissioners approved the rule so drafted, without com-
ment, except that Commissioner Sumner Pike said, "Well, we are against fraud, aren't
we?" Id. See also 1 A. BROMBaR, supra note 1, at 22.6.
The Commission's official release, announcing and explaining the new rule 10b-5
[SEC Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942)] stated that: "The new rule closes
a loophole in the protections against fraud . . . by prohibiting individuals or companies
from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase."
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973) (emphasis added). Section 240.10b-5 (2), con-
demning untrue statements and misleading omissions, constitutes the operative language
upon which many of the litigated cases are based.
16. 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
17. Id. at 828-29. Among the cases which have quoted this passage was Judge Win-
ter's district court opinion in Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128, 139 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd
as to liability, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969). Judge Winter is now one of the circuit judges
on the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
[VOL. XXXIII
1973] SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS
wrongs against a whole class of investors, usually in a public
company, who have bought or sold securities without significant
information which management should have disclosed publicly.
The latter type of case, typified by SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co. ," is peculiarly adapted to litigation of national scale in the
federal courts, and is beyond the scope of this article.'" In addi-
tion, the history, similarity and differences between the various
regulatory provisions and principles, which has been touched
upon in the foregoing discussion, has been examined fully in lead-
ing treatises.' " For these reasons the following discussion will be
limited to cases involving what a leading writer has called "direct
personal dealings,"' and emphasis will be placed on decisions of
federal cases arising within the Fourth Circuit, as well as Mary-
land cases dealing with the points of Maryland law applicable in
this general field.
COMMON LAW AND EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES
Historically, the state common law or equitable principles
regulating securities dealings began with the recognition of a right
of rescission in equity to the injured party, either buyer or seller,
when the transaction was induced by material misrepresen-
tations." In this early period, however, an injured party who
sought to recover damages at law for his injury was faced with the
18. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), noted in 82 HARv.
L. REV. 938 (1969).
19. For a discussion and treatment of this broader area see Wiesen, Disclosure of
Inside Information-Materiality and Texas Gulf Sulphur, 28 MD. L. REv. 189 (1968). See
also Bahlman, Rule 10b-5, The Case for its Full Acceptance as Federal Corporation Law,
37 U. CtN. L. REv. 727 (1968); Comment, SEC Rule 10b-5: A Recent Profile, 13 WM. &
MARY L. Rxv. 860 (1972).
20. 3 L. Loss, supra note 8, at 1430-48, 1623-1796; 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 1, at
57-58, 83-88.2. See also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193-
95 (1963); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Co., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961). See generally Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 500 (1966); Annot., 84
A.L.R. 615 (1933).
21. 1 A. BROMBERO, supra note 1, at 67-88.1. Most of these cases involve dealings
between the seller and the purchaser, but a minority have presented similar questions
between one of these parties and a broker. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297
F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970).
22. In Maryland, relief in equity from a contract induced by a misrepresentation
(involving not a securities transaction but a mortgage), even if the representation was not
known to be false, began at least as early as 1833, with Joice v. Taylor, 6 G. & J. 54 (Md.
1833). A number of cases have applied the same principle in securities dealings. See, e.g.,
Shulton, Inc. v. Rubin, 239 Md. 669, 212 A.2d 476 (1965); Sears v. Barker, 155 Md. 323,
141 A. 908 (1928); Findlay v. Baltimore Trust & Guar. Co., 97 Md. 716, 55 A. 379 (1903);
Negley v. Hagerstown Mfg., Mining & Land Improvement Co., 86 Md. 692, 39 A. 506
(1898).
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established legal principle that no recovery could be obtained
unless the defendant had been guilty of intentional deceit or what
was termed "fraud".2 3
In the rescission cases, in equity, there has long been a tend-
ency to relax the requirement of scienter on the part of the defen-
dant, and in the relatively recent case of Shulton, Inc. v. Rubin 2
rescission was again allowed without proof that the defendant
intended to mislead the injured party. However, it was not until
1957 that the Maryland Court of Appeals, in Schmidt v.
Millhauser,25 extended the common law fraud action to allow
damages at law for misrepresentations shown to have been made
not intentionally but with "reckless disregard of truth." Thus it
has been established that the victim of a misrepresentation so
made has the option of rescission in equity, or of suit for damages
at law;26 but the proof required as to the defendant's guilty or
reckless state of mind may still be involved in some doubt.
In the cases involving fiduciary duty of controlling persons in
a corporation, who sell to or buy from the minority, as previously
indicated, 27 a different principle has repeatedly been recognized.
The principle was clearly enunciated as early as 1909 in the opin-
ion of Justice Peckham for the Supreme Court in Strong v.
Repide.21 This case was an appeal from the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands, and the United States Supreme Court held
that the chief executive officer and director of a company, who
also owned three-fourths of its stock, violated his fiduciary duty
in buying the plaintiff's stock without disclosing his pending ne-
gotiations to sell the company's lands to the United States gov-
ernment for a price representing a value for the stock many times
the price which he had paid. The Court held that his conduct
violated provisions of the Philippine Civil Code,but commented
that "[t]his is the rule of the common law also, ' 2 and contin-
ued:
23. Donnelly v. Baltimore Trust & Guar. Co., 102 Md. 1, 61 A. 301 (1905); Cahill v.
Applegarth, 98 Md. 493, 56 A. 794 (1904). This rule appears not to have been relaxed until
the case of Schmidt v. Millhauser, 212 Md. 585, 130 A.2d 572 (1957).
24. 239 Md. 669, 212 A.2d 476 (1965).
25. 212 Md. 585, 130 A.2d 572 (1957).
26. Recovery either at law or equity both normally require a misrepresentation in
the form of an untrue statement. A mere omission to reveal known facts is ordinarily not
enough; however, as will be shown, when the omission is by one who stands in a fiduciary
position then that omission may be sufficient for a cause of action. See MacGill v. Mac-
Gill, 135 Md. 384, 109 A. 72 (1919).
27. See notes 3-5 supra and accompanying text.
28. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
29. Id. at 430.
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[Blut in both cases it is based upon the proposition that,
under all the circumstances of the case, it was the duty of
the party who obtained the consent, [of the plaintiff to the
sale] acting in good faith, to have disclosed the facts which
he concealed. . . . In such cases concealment is equivalent
to misrepresentation."
In the same vein, but without citing Strong, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland in 1919 rendered two decisions based on a
similar view of the responsibility of controlling stockholders and
directors who purchase, or cause their corporation to acquire, the
stock of a minority holder or holders; or who sell, or cause the
corporation to sell, shares of its stock to others, in each case
without disclosing material and significant facts known to them.
In the first case, McGaw v. Hoen," the controlling directors held
certain outstanding "due bills" or notes of the company and ar-
ranged for it to sell a large block of stock to an outsider without
disclosing the existence of these notes. The purchaser, on discov-
ering the facts, obtained a decree enjoining the enforcement of the
notes, which was approved by the Court of Appeals."
The second case, MacGill v. MacGill,3 involved a scheme by
which the controlling stockholders and directors proposed and
recommended to the minority stockholders that they convert
their common stock into preferred stock. This was done without
informing the minority that the company had become prosperous
due to war conditions and that the common stock was worth
substantially more than the preferred. The court had no difficulty
in setting aside this plan because of the fiduciary relation of the
defendants to the minority. The court's citations and reasoning
establish its position that the directors violated a fiduciary obli-
gation similar to that which they owed to the corporation itself.34
30. Id.
31. 133 Md. 672, 106 A. 13 (1919).
32. The court's opinion, by Chief Justice Boyd, says: "[lIt can not be doubted that
Messrs. McGaw and Harlow were in equity and justice under obligation to make known
to the purchaser the fact that they held such certificates and claimed to be entitled to be
paid for them." Id. at 680, 106 A. at 16.
33. 135 Md. 384, 109 A. 72 (1919).
34. Roger Clapp, discussing this case in his article, A Fiduciary's Duty of Loyalty,
3 MD. L. REv. 221 (1939), describes MacGill as "an a fortiori case for the application of
these principles. Directors of acorporation and the owners of a majority of its stock, who
induced minority stockholders to exchange their common stock for preferred stock without
disclosing that the corporation had earned large profits and would pay correspondingly
large dividends on the common stock, were held to have violated their fiduciary duty."
Id. at 234-35.
The court in MacGill quoted at length from Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Parish,
19731
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Thus, the court expanded the principle of the director's fiduciary
duty to include an identical obligation to the uninformed individ-
ual stockholders from whom material information was withheld.
In the MacGill case the deception practiced on the minority
stockholders was no doubt beneficial to the corporation and its
majority stockholders; yet the court held that the fiduciary duty
to the injured minority, which had been violated by the control-
ling parties, outweighed any conflicting fiduciary duty owed to
the corporation which they controlled.35
A comparison of the McGaw and MacGill cases with the
opinion of the Supreme Court in Strong v. Repide indicates that
all three support the view that a director or directors who are in
a position of control in their corporation must disclose pertinent
facts to a buyer or seller with whom they deal individually. While
MacGill would seemingly place Maryland in the group of states
which recognize a fiduciary duty owed by a director to an individ-
ual stockholder in such a situation, the Supreme Court in Strong
outlined "special facts" which would compel disclosure even if,
in the ordinary case, a director as such would not ordinarily owe
such a duty. The special facts so stated in Mr. Justice Peckham's
opinion were: the director who failed to make disclosure "owned
three-fourths" of the corporation's stock; he was administrator
general of the company, with large powers; as such, he was en-
gaged in the negotiations which finally led to the sale of the
company's lands at a price which very greatly enhanced the value
of the stock; the negotiations were for the sale of the whole of the
42 Md. 598 (1875). There, a successful complaint had been filed by the corporation itself,
and the court had said that the defendant director "bore an important fiduciary relation
to the company, as well as one of trust and confidence in the general control and manage-
ment of its affairs. . . . such directors or managers being in fact trustees and agents of
the bodies represented by them." 135 Md. at 393-94, 109 A. at 75, quoting Cumberland
Coal & Iron Co. v. Parish, 42 Md. 598, 604-05 (1875). Having quoted this statement, the
MacGill court went on to say, "[t]he facts alleged are sufficient, in our opinion, to bring
the defendants fully within the principles announced by this Court in the cases ... .
135 Md. at 394, 109 A. at 75.
35. These two cases, McGaw and MacGill, have never been questioned by the Court
of Appeals. However, a statement by Judge Grason in a 1946 case, Llewellyn v. Queen
City Dairy, Inc., 187 Md. 49, 48 A.2d 322 (1946), which was not necessary to the decision,
expresses doubt as to the existence of a general fiduciary duty owed by a director to an
individual stockholder. While not mentioning MacGill, the court cites with approval cases
in other states holding that the mere director-stockholder relationship does not impose a
fiduciary duty on the director when he purchases a stockholder's stock, in the absence of
"fraud or concealment," which Judge Grason found not to exist in the case before him.
Id. at 60, 48 A.2d at 327. In the same year, however, the court, in Ross Transport, Inc. v.
Crothers, 185 Md. 573, 45 A.2d 267 (1946), holding that a sale of company stock to
directors should be voided, discussed and approved the fiduciary cases, including MacGill.
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property of the company; no one knew as well as he the exact
condition of such negotiations, the probability of the sale of the
lands to the government and the probable price that might be
obtained on such sale; and, the lands were the only valuable asset
owned by the company."
In view of the Maryland cases, as set forth, and the consider-
ations stated by the Supreme Court in Strong, a carefully deline-
ated touchstone is presented to the Maryland practitioner for
advising as to the duty of a controlling stockholder-director, in
Maryland, to disclose facts known to him when he proposes to
purchase stock of a minority or sell securities of the company to
a minority. Whether these rules would apply in a case involving
a non-controlling stockholder-director, however, may still be open
to some question.
These conditions exist in the body of Maryland case law,
apart from federal rule 10b-5 and the Maryland Securities Act.31
In view of the fiduciary duty recognized in these cases, and the
burden of proof imposed upon a fiduciary to justify the fairness
of his conduct,38 the litigant may find that a count in his com-
plaint based on the general state law may have equal value with
a count directly based on rule 10b-5, at least as regards the issue
of liability.
An increasing number of state courts now support the view
that a fiduciary obligation of full disclosure rests on a director
who purchases stock of his corporation from minority stockhold-
ers.3" The states taking this view are Georgia, Kansas, Idaho,
Iowa, Maryland and New York.40
36. 213 U.S. at 431-32.
37. MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 13 et seq. (1971).
38. See Parish v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc., 250 Md. 24, 101-02,
242 A.2d 512, 555 (1968), repeated in second appeal after trial on the merits, 261 Md. 618,
695, 277 A.2d 19, 55, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971) (releasee, being in confidential
relation, "cannot escape from the burden of proving . . . the absence of fraud, undue
influence or over-reaching and the releasor's knowledge of all relevant facts"). See also
Cummings v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 237 Md. 1, 24, 204 A.2d 795, 807 (1964);
Indurated Concrete Corp. v. Abbott, 195 Md. 496, 504, 74 A.2d 17, 20 (1950) ("the onus
of proof . . . [is] . . . upon him [the fiduciary] to establish the perfect fairness, ade-
quacy, and equity of the transaction").
39. The principle appears to be stated broadly on the basis of a fiduciary duty
imposed on all directors purchasing from minority stockholders; however, in several of the
cases the defendant-director was in fact a "controlling" person.
40. See, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903); Weatherby v. Weath-
erby Lumber Co., 94 Idaho 504, 492 P.2d 43 (1972); Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176
Iowa 362, 157 N.W. 929 (1916), approved and followed in, Berger v. Amana Society, 253
Iowa 378, 111 N.W.2d 753 (1962); Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 P. 277 (1904); Falk
v. Hoffman, 233 N.Y. 199, 135 N.E. 243 (1922); Sautter v. Fulmer, 258 N.Y. 107, 179 N.E.
19731
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In summation, Maryland clearly appears to be one of the
states in which at least controlling stockholder-directors and
probably all directors have an established common law or equit-
able duty to disclose pertinent facts before buying stock from
minority stockholders who are ignorant of such facts.4 If the con-
trolling parties proceed without making such disclosure, the case
law indicates that a substantial burden of proof as to the fairness
of the transaction is imposed on them, and the transaction, if
challenged, cannot stand unless they affirmatively establish its
complete fairness.
THE MARYLAND SECURITIES ACT
In 1962, long after rule 10b-5 was adopted but before its use
in litigation became widespread, the Maryland Securities Act
was enacted . 2 Section 13 of this act contains a general pronounce-
ment in virtually the same language as the rule,4" that it shall be
unlawful:
. . . in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any
security, directly or indirectly: (1) to employ any device,
311 (1932). A sixth state taking this position is, of course, Maryland, as shown previously
in this section.
41. To what extent liability will be imposed on insiders other than controlling share-
holders is unsettled in Maryland. Professor Loss recognizes that the holding of the cases
cited in note 40 supra, as to the fiduciary duty owed by a mere non-controlling director
to a stockholder (with which Maryland appears to agree in the MacGill case), is a minority
rule, but he makes this comment:
In actual results the old "majority" rule [under which officers and directors have
a fiduciary obligation only to the corporation and to the stockholders in their deal-
ings with or on behalf of the corporation] has substantially merged into the "special
circumstances" doctrine [of Strong v. Repide] which in turn is scarecely distin-
guishable from the so-called "minority" rule .... It seems fair to conclude from
all this that the so-called "majority" view is gradually giving way to the generally
growing feeling of responsibility of corporate insiders-the development of a status
of "trusteeship" in a non-technical sense.
3 L. Loss, supra note 8, at 1447-1448, referring also to his previous discussion at 1 L. Loss,
supra note 8, at 17-18.
An interesting dictum of Chief Judge Parker of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Brown v. Eastern States Corp., 181 F.2d 26 (4th Cir. 1950), includes the following
statement:
The president and directors occupied a fiduciary relationship towards the stock-
holders, and for them to put forward a plan under which the assets of the corpora-
tion would be used in the purchase of stock in a way which would so greatly profit
one of their number, would be difficult to justify under any principles of law or
equity with which we are familiar.
Id. at 29.
42. Ch. 1, [1962] Md. Laws 3 [codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 13 et seq.
(1971)].
43. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
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scheme, or artifice to defraud, (2) to make any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they are made, not mis-
leading, or (3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person."
The virtual identity between this language and the language
of rule 10b-5 is apparent; and it has been stated by the first
Maryland Securities Commissioner, Decatur H. Miller, that this
section of the Act "is a substantially verbatim copy of Rule 10b-
5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and consequently
inherits a long line of judicial and administrative precedent. '" '45 It
may be asserted without contradiction that the "long line of
precedent" supports a private right of action to anyone injured
by these proscribed acts. While the federal rule 10b-5 has no
specific provision granting a right of action to the injured party,
the federal courts have consistently held that its substantive pro-
visions demand and require that such a right of action be recog-
nized, equally on behalf of an injured buyer or an injured seller
of securities." The principal ground given for recognition of a civil
liability is called "statutory tort." The Restatement of Torts
takes the position that a person injured by violation of a statute
enacted for the benefit of persons in his position is entitled to
recover his damages.47
44. MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 13 (1971).
45. Miller, A Prospectus on the Maryland Securities Act, 23 MD. L. REV. 289, 294
(1963).
46. A large number of cases assert that the rule implies a right of civil recovery for
violations, beginning with Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457 (D. Del. 1947),
99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956). See, e.g., Superintendent
of Ins. v, Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), noted in, 1972 DUKE L.J. 465;
Fischmann v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Kardon v. National Gyp-
sum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See also 3 L. Loss, supra note 8, at 1763 nn.260-
61, supplemented in 6 L. Loss, SEcuarr s REGULATION 3871 (Supp. 1969); Annot., 37
A.L.R.2d 649 (1954); Ruder, Civil Liability under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision ofLegisla-
tive Intent, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 627 (1964).
47. See 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 29-30, citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286
(1934). Two other grounds upon which civil liability has been based are: the "void con-
tract" theory, that the 1934 Act itself grants a private right of action under § 29(b), which
provides that "[elvery contract made in violation [of the statute or any rule thereunder]
• ..shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (b) (1970); and, the theory expressed in J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), that the language "for the protection of investors" which
appears in § 14(a) of the 1934 Act implies "the availability of judicial relief where neces-
sary to achieve that result." Id. at 432. Thus, where federally secured rights are invaded,
the federal courts may "adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief." Id. at
433.
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This ground of statutory tort would be equally applicable to
the Maryland Securities Act but for the provision of section 34 of
the Act which, while preserving "any other rights or remedies
that may exist at law or in equity, ' 48 states that "this act does
not create any cause of action not specified. ' 49 The Maryland Act
specifically grants a right of action to an injured buyer but omits
any reference to an action by an injured seller.50 Section 34 of the
Maryland Securities Act, in asserting that the Act "does not cre-
ate any cause of action not specified," appears to run counter to
the supposed general intention to adopt rule 10b-5 as to intrastate
transactions, together with the established interpretation of the
rule that it does create a right of action, by implication, in favor
of an injured seller as well as an injured buyer. If section 34 is
applied literally, it follows that a fundamental distinction and
difference must be recognized as between the rights of an injured
seller under the federal law and his corresponding rights under
the state law. It would seem that the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land would seek to avoid this distinction if possible, by relying
upon the overriding general policy to grant correlative rights as
to securities transactions to sellers as well as to buyers, but until
the question has been raised and decided, or an amendment
made to the Securities Act, no categorical answer can be given
to this question.
What is clear, however, is that section 34 does provide that
the specific rights and remedies granted by the Act "are in addi-
tion to any other rights or remedies that may exist at law or in
equity." This would preserve the right of an injured seller under
proper circumstances to seek redress pursuant to the principles
48. MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 34(h) (1971).
49. Id.
50. MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 34(a)(2) (1971). Section 34 of the Maryland Securi-
ties Act was adopted from the Uniform Securities Act, which contained no civil liability
against buyers. The draftsmen of the Uniform Act felt that there was:
[N]o clear need to create any civil liability against buyers as distinct from sellers.
Although the lower federal courts have uniformly implied a civil cause of action
against fraudulent buyers under the SEC rule, the federal courts when applying
federal law do not have at their disposal all of the common-law and equitable
remedies of deceit and rescission which are avilable to the state courts without
benefit of statute. In the area of civil liability, moreover, it seems not only unneces-
sary but unwise to disturb the general jurisprudence which has been developing
with reference, for example, to the obligation of corporate insiders to make affirma-
tive disclosure when purchasing from existing stockholders. On the other hand, the
general law is not adequate to deal with flagrant cases of fraud by buyers on a
criminal level, and there can of course, be no public action for an injunction against
such practices without specific statutory authority.
Draftsmen's Comment, Uniform Securities Act § 101.
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set forth in MacGill v. MacGill,5' recognizing a fiduciary duty of
a controlling stockholder-director to disclose pertinent informa-
tion to a minority shareholder before purchase from that share-
holder.
RULE 1OB-5
Requirements for Federal Jurisdiction
Federal jurisdiction in 10b-5 cases rests upon the assertion of
a claim based upon federal law. The rule requires that the
wrongful acts of the defendant must be committed "in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security" and that some "means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce" be used.52
The cases have interpreted these requirements broadly. Ju-
risdiction usually rests on the use of the mails53 or of the telephone
service,54 and such use need not include the transmission of the
alleged untrue or misleading statements.55 For example, it ap-
pears to be sufficient if the use of these interstate facilities is
reasonably called for in connection with the development of the
transaction, or any aspect of the transfer of the securities, or
payments or releases incident to the consummation of the trans-
action.56 In addition, while at one time there was a conflict in the
cases as to whether local telephone calls were sufficient on which
to predicate jurisdiction, this point seems now to be affirmatively
established by the current weight of authority, the reasoning of
the courts being that the entire telephone service is an interstate
facility which is being used, whether or not the particular calls
shown did in fact cross state lines. It would be a rare transaction
indeed if all aspects of a sale of securities could be carried out
with no use of the mails or of telephone service.
51. 135 Md. 384, 109 A. 72 (1919).
52. The other listed means for a violation are the use of the mails or any national
securities exchange.
53. The mails need only be used incidentally. See Hooper v. Mountain States Sec.
Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Northern Trust Co.
v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Ill. 1952). See also 3 L. Loss, supra
note 8, at 1522-25.
54. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 8, at 1522-25.
55. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Levin v.
Marder, 343 F. Supp. 1050 (W.D. Pa. 1972). See also 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 245.
56. See 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 245 n.5.
57. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968); Levin v. Marder, 343 F. Supp. 1050 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Ingraffia v. Belle Meade
Hosp., 319 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. La. 1970); Esplanade, Inc. v. Maryland Land & Inv. Co.,
Civ. No. 19092 (D. Md. Apr. 19, 1968). But see Burke v. Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc., 438
F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1971).
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Even if the case, as based on rule 10b-5, is not established
upon trial, the applicable state law, whether statutory or based
on the course of decision, may recognize a cause of action arising
from the same facts. Federal courts have pendent jurisdiction of
state law claims arising out of the same facts as 10b-5 or other
federal claims." It follows that a violation of the state law, if it
exists, should be pleaded in the complaint filed in the federal
court. Accordingly, it is often alleged, in a 10b-5 case, that the
acts complained of were: violative of rule 10b-5; violative of sec-
tion 13 (or a similar section of the applicable state securities act);
and if, special facts exist such as a fiduciary or confidential rela-
tionship, violative of legal or equitable principles recognized by
the applicable state law. 5 All of these matters can thus be
brought before the federal court in a single proceeding, while the
state court could exercise no jurisdiction over the federal claim.60
Materiality, Reliance and Scienter
Ordinarily the plaintiff in litigation brought under rule 10b-
5 must show a purchase or sale of a security induced in part by a
material misrepresentation, or by the non-disclosure of material
information known to the defendant in order to establish his
case."' The burden of proof rests on the complainant as to these
58. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Hurn v. Oursler, 289
U.S. 238 (1933). See also Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1040, 1115-20 (1966); Lowenfels, Pendent
Jurisdiction and the Federal Securities Acts, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1018 (1967); Mills,
Pendent Jurisdiction and Extraterritorial Service Under the Federal Securities Laws, 70
COLUM. L. REv. 423 (1970).
59. See, e.g., Schine v. Schine, 250 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 367
F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1966), in which claims under the state law were included in the
complaint.
60. Under section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, exclusive jurisdiction
with respect to matters regulated under section 10(b) of the Act is conferred on the federal
courts. The ultimate in legal confusion and frustration will be realized if a complainant,
supposing his case to be impregnable under state law, seeks first a remedy in the state
court, only to find that that tribunal disagrees with him; then he files an action in the
federal court under rule 10b-5, and is met with defenses of res adjudicata and collateral
estoppel. See Note, Effect of Prior Nonfederal Proceedings on Exclusive Federal Jurisdic-
tion Over Section 10(b), 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 936 (1971).
61. Several leading decisions have said that it is necessary only to prove . . .
one of the prohibited actions, such as a material misstatement of fact or the omis-
sion of a material fact. However, this seems to be an oversimplification. A more
balanced view, better reflective of the current of decision, is that recovery requires,
in addition, proof of an injury in some significant way connected with the violation.
2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 223 (footnotes omitted).
An exception may be suggested to Professor Bromberg's statement, that is, the case
in which the defendant occupies a fiduciary position with respect to the plaintiff and has
made a profit on the property purchased from his beneficiary. In such a case the plaintiff
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essential matters.62
Other elements, frequently discussed in the cases, are "reli-
ance" and "scienter." An increasing number of decisions appear
to hold that, if "materiality" of the misrepresentation or of the
omitted fact is shown, this may supply any requirement of prov-
ing reliance, and the recent Supreme Court decision in Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States,6 3 dealing with nondisclosure of a
material fact, appears to have settled the law in favor of this view.
The Court there said:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primar-
ily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a
prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts
withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor
might have considered them important in the making of this
decision . . . [citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375, 384 (1970) and other authorities] . . . This obliga-
tion to disclose and this withholding of a material fact estab-
lish the requisite element of causation in fact.64
As far as proof of the defendant's scienter, or guilty state of
mind, is concerned,65 it is questionable whether the weight of
modern authority supports such a requirement, at least if the
word bears any resemblance to the state of mind required to
shown common law fraud. In his treatise, Bromberg, after some
two hundred pages discussing scienter, reaches no firm conclu-
sion, except that actual knowledge by the defendant of the mate-
rial fact not disclosed is enough scienter for liability in these
cases." Cases that have been decided in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Maryland appear to reject any re-
quirement of guilty intent but seem to require actual knowledge
might be unable to show a direct loss to himself, but the defendant, by his wrongdoing,
has made a profit on plaintiff's property which it is unconscionable for him to retain. See
Garner v. Boyd, 330 F. Supp. 22, 26 (N.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd, 447 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1971).
As to following a trust res improperly acquired from the beneficiary by the fiduciary see
MacBryde v. Burnett, 132 F.2d 898 (4th Cir. 1942). See also Notes 119-28 infra and
accompanying text.
62. Under Maryland law, where the defendant stood in a fiduciary or confidential
relationship to the complainant the burden appears to rest on the fiduciary to establish
the complete fairness of the transaction. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
63. 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (the Reyos Case).
64. Id. at 153-54.
65. There are many different meanings of the word as used in the cases, ranging
from intentional deceit to negligence. For a discussion of this semantic confusion see 2 A.
BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 204.102-.104.
66. 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 204.137. See 2 A. BROMBERG, id. at 204.11-.260.
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of the omitted fact, or negligent conduct of the defendant (some-
thing less than common law fraud).67
Material Facts Requiring Disclosure
A particularly significant inquiry in evaluating any 10b-5
complaint or potential complaint is to ascertain what facts and
what undisclosed facts have been deemed material in the re-
ported cases. The existence and extent of the obligation of a fidu-
ciary under state law to disclose material facts is consistent with
the obligation of a control person under rule 10b-5 to make similar
disclosures. Each of these regulatory principles, therefore, lends
support to the other, and they are independently and severally
enforceable by the federal court in a single action pleading the
non-disclosure." A review of a number of decided cases involving
non-disclosure may assist in developing certain classes of signifi-
cant non-disclosures which have been deemed to be actionable,
and the following discussion attempts to classify these.
If the securities being purchased by controlling parties or
"insiders" have a market value not readily known to the other
party, this must be disclosed by such purchasers.69 If, however,
the securities have no market value, significant factors bearing on
the fair value of such securities must be revealed.7 ° In all cases,
67. See Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D. 545, 549 (D. Md. 1971); Johns Hopkins
Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1219-20 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part, 422 F.2d 1124
(4th Cir. 1970); Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128, 140 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd as to liability,
412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969).
68. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947), upholding
a complaint both as based on fiduciary duty and as claiming under rule 10b-5. Both
grounds are also asserted in Schine v. Schine, 250 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal
dismissed, 367 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1966), which is still pending in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. In Schine the court said that "the prime
thrust of their [the plaintiffs'] charges is that the defendants failed to disclose material
facts which, as controlling stockholders, they were under a duty to disclose, both under
common law principles and by virtue of statutory command." Id. at 826. In Kohler v.
Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963), while the court decided that the plaintiff under
the particular circumstances was not entitled to relief, it said that section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 are "intended to create a form of fiduciary relationship between so-called corporate
'insiders' and 'outsiders' with whom they deal in company securities, which places upon
the insider duties more exacting than mere abstention from what generally is thought to
be fraudulent practices." Id. at 637. An interesting discussion of the interdependence of a
breach of fiduciary duty by insiders and violation of rule 10b-5 by the same action will be
found in 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 83-88.1.
69. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), where the
purchasers recognized the obligation to make such disclosure, but represented that the
value was lower than what the Court later found to be the true value.
70. In the case of In re Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943), the
SEC determined that there had been a violation of the rule, where two officers of a
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recent financial statements available to the insiders would ordi-
narily be included in the required disclosure."
In a negotiation or discussion with outside parties in antici-
pation of a sale of the company, its assets or its securities, or a
merger, involving valuation, these developments would appear to
constitute material information to which a minority stockholder
would be entitled, even if the negotiation or discussion never
reached the stage of agreement." If the negotiations develop evi-
dence of a value higher than that proposed by the insiders, no
ground can be perceived for excluding such evidence and it would
have convincing probative force.
Several of the cases have stressed the need of disclosure of
any significant recent developments as to the company, and espe-
cially plans for disposition of the business or a material change
in its operations. Thus, in Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,13 the
insiders (a controlling parent corporation), finding that the com-
pany's inventory of tobacco had greatly increased in value due to
a shortage of tobacco and had a cash value substantially greater
than the valuation carried on its books, developed a program to
buy in minority stock at slightly more than its market value (the
market being thin). The remaining stockholders, including the
parent, would then realize a profit on the tobacco inventory by
the sale of the inventory and liquidation of the subsidiary com-
pany. The court not only condemned the non-disclosures, but
took the position that the offer of the parent company to buy in
the stock of the subsidiary was, due to its fiduciary position, a
representation that the offering price was fair. Because of the
facts known to the controlling stockholder, its action constituted
company arranged for it to buy certain shares at from three to six dollars per share when
they hoped to sell controlling stock for many times that amount, and proposed to have
the company liquidated for an amount which would yield the other stockholders twenty-
five dollars a share. All of these matters, the Commission determined, should have been
disclosed. Stockholders who had sold received a settlement of over $165,000. See 3 L. Loss,
supra note 8, at 1457 n.46.
71. Cases in which such statements and complete financial information were not
furnished, but were regarded as material include: Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Schine v. Schine, 250 F. Supp. 822, 254 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Speed v. Transa-
merica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (on motion to dismiss complaint), 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.
1947) (on the merits), 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (on requests for additional findings).
72. See 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 69-72, stating that "[tihe archetypal 10b-
5 case is the purchase by one group in a closed corporation of the interest of another,
without disclosing negotiations for sale or other disposition of the issuer's assets or its
securities at a higher price." Id. at 70 (footnote omitted).
73. 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
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an affirmative, false and fraudulent representation."4
In Janigan v. Taylor,7" the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit stressed the fact that the company's condition was sub-
stantially improving and that its orders and backlog were greatly
increased. The importance of these non-disclosed but favorable
facts was emphasized by the president's answering an inquiry by
stating that things were "about the same." While ordinarily
statements of expectations as to future gains to be made by the
company are not favored, in Janigan favorable projections based
on "observed trends" would, according to the court, have been in
order and the offering of projections based on the facts observed
would have been proper for the stockholders to whom the insiders
were making their offers of purchase."
In several cases the courts have regarded a negotiation for
sale of the company, its assets or a substantial block of its stock,
as sufficiently material to require disclosure.77 However, there is
an initial point of negotiation at which disclosure is not required.
In List v. Fashion Park, Inc.," where relief was denied on the
facts, the court concluded that at the critical time when the pur-
chase of stock was made negotiations for the sale of the business
had not begun. The facts disclosed that nothing more had hap-
pened but the passing of a directors' resolution to seek a sale and
the assertion by a union leader that a buyer was interested.
As to the time when the materiality of the negotiation, as
involving the need of disclosure, should be assessed, the following
74. Id. at 849.
75. 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
76. It would also appear that in Janigan the books had been "juggled" by repricing
the inventory and deferring posting of some sales from December to January, which
reduced income of the prior fiscal year. Other cases have commented on errors in state-
ments. See, e.g., Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962) (where
land cost was not taken into account in an income projection); Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall
Corp., 201 F. Supp. 466 (D. Del. 1962) (where the court found an error in overvaluation
of properties).
77. See Levin v. Marder, 343 F. Supp. 1050 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (where one offer was
disclosed but an earlier proposal which might have been better was not disclosed); Ross
v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (where plaintiffs were considering sale to
insiders at $120 per share but the insider-defendants were having discussions as to possible
private sale at $300, to be followed by a possible public offering at $600); Schine v. Schine,
250 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (where there were several negotiations but not all were
disclosed); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951) (where the
insiders knew, but did not disclose that the corporation's tobacco inventory, a major asset,
had an increased cash value several times its cost or book value, and the insiders were
considering plans for realizing on this higher value).
78. 227 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 811 (1965).
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problems arise. If the relation of the parties is such that a duty
of disclosure of material facts may exist, when does such a duty
arise, and does the duty continue until settlement and delivery
of the stock to the insider, or is the duty measured solely by
knowledge acquired by him at or prior to the time when the
parties committed themselves to the sale? One case in the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which seemingly decides this
question, is Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz.79 In the dis-
trict court the judge allowed the case to go to the jury, which
decided in favor of the defendants." The plaintiff appealed, com-
plaining of the judge's charge, and on appeal the decision was
affirmed. The appellate court expressed the view that the duty
of disclosure ended when the seller and buyer had committed
themselves by agreement to the sale, and therefore the duty did
not continue as to subsequent negotiations and facts learned by
the buyer thereafter.5 ' No other appellate case, at this writing,
appears to have considered and decided this question, and Profes-
sor Bromberg has suggested, in discussing the effect of a release
by the plaintiff, that there is "an opportunity for falseness or
omission at the closing as a result of intervening developments."8
In fact, in the earlier decision of Schine v. Schine3 the District
Court for the Southern District of New York considered the facts
known by the insider-buyer up to the time of settlement, in sus-
taining a complaint.
Conceivably Schine may be distinguishable from Radiation
Dynamics. Due to the relation of the parties, an imperative obli-
gation of disclosure, including a strong fiduciary duty, existed in
79. 464 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1972).
80. 323 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
81. It may be suggested that, since federal jurisdiction may be first acquired or
triggered by use of interstate facilities at the time of and in connection with the settle-
ment, it requires a very fine point of distinction to hold that the duty of disclosure under
the rule had terminated at the earlier date when an agreement or commitment was
reached as to the sale and purchase contract.
82. 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 288.1-.2.
A delayed closing typical of formal agreements, permits postcontractual investiga-
tion and evaluation that further tends to disprove reliance on undisclosed informa-
tion. But representations and warranties are customarily recited to be true at the
closing as well as the making of the contract, and thus present an opportunity for
falseness or omission at the closing as a result of intervening developments. Even
without specification of truth at the closing, it is arguable that the sale is still being
made at this point, which must thus be currently free from misrepresentation or
omission. In other words, disclosure may be a continuing obligation through the
closing.
Id.
83. 250 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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the earlier district court case of Schine. In Radiation Dynamics,
however, the facts showed a weak or non-existent fiduciary duty
of the insider-purchasers to the plaintiff (RDI), which actually
acquired its stock after it had contracted to make the first of the
resales of which it complained. It was apparent to all parties that
RDI not only was not a previous stockholder but intended to
realize on the stock, by resale or obtaining a large cash loan,
immediately after acquiring it. Thus, there was no history of a
director-stockholder relationship, nor any confidential basis on
which a typical fiduciary obligation could be predicated.
What law there is in Maryland would indicate that the duty
of disclosure continues until settlement;84 and, due to the ines-
capable fiduciary duty of a controlling person buying from an
outsider stockholder, he has a continuing obligation to establish
the complete fairness of the transaction. Since equity deals with
substance rather than form, this would seemingly include a con-
tinuing obligation of disclosure until the sale is fully consum-
mated, and possibly even thereafter until existing negotiations for
resale or other disposition have been consumated or terminated.
Defenses to Suit
A number of defenses to a 10b-5 suit have been raised in the
cases. These may be generally classified as follows: general legal
defenses (including laches, limitations, waiver and estoppel); re-
leases (including release of prior dispute or litigation), and, plain-
tiff's asserted lack of diligence.
Certain general comments may be made on the subject of
defenses. First, the relationship of the parties may be of particu-
lar significance in the application of these asserted defenses. For
84. Maryland law appears to present a liberality as to extension of the period of
required disclosure; that is, evidence appears to be admissible of facts occurring after the
injured party has been induced to enter into a contract with the defendant but prior to
ultimate settlement under the contract. See Summons v. State, 156 Md. 382, 144 A. 497
(1929), a case involving conviction for obtaining money by false pretenses. The court there
said:
Where a party has been induced by false pretences to enter into a contract, the
party who has so procured the party's agreement to the contract cannot have
excluded the evidence of his subequent misrepresentations, whereby he comples the
original fraud upon his victim by securing the full fruit of the fraud.
Id. at 385, 144 A. at 499. The theory supporting this position in the securities context is
that if the contract was voidable for misrepresentation or equivalent non-disclosure at the
time when it was signed by the parties, any further dealings between them which induced
the actual settlement or payment should likewise be viewed as subject to the continued
requirement of full disclosure, at least by a party occupying a fiduciary position.
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example, if the alleged wrongdoer owed a fiduciary duty to the
plaintiff, his conduct must be measured in the light of this re-
sponsibility, and the burden of proof as to issues involving the
respective conduct of the parties may be shifted from the plaintiff
to the defendant. Indeed, under the Maryland law the defendant
may be required to establish the complete fairness of the ques-
tioned transaction.85 The plaintiff's duty in such a case would be
correspondingly diminished. If the plaintiff has suffered no mea-
surable injury as a result of the defendant's alleged violation of
duty, it is highly questionable whether, in the ordinary case, even
nominal relief could be obtained, with the exception of cases
involving a profit realized by the defendant through breach of
fiduciary duty. Similarly, causation of the injury would appear to
be an essential part of the plaintiff's case; thus, if the defendant
is charged with non-disclosure of a material fact, and the plaintiff
knew the fact, he would ordinarily not be entitled to relief.8
In the case of such defenses as limitations and laches, the
period of statutory limitations, or of reasonable time before bring-
ing suit, would ordinarily not begin running until knowledge, or
at least ground for suspicion, has been brought to the attention
of the plaintiff. In the usual action based on rule 10b-5, the most
closely analogous state statute of limitations is customarily ap-
plied, since there is no directly applicable federal statute.,7 The
present section 34(e)8" of the Maryland Securities Act would be
85. See notes 27-41 supra and accompanying text.
86. Causation of the injury is sometimes referred to as "reliance"; in non-disclosure
cases "reliance" seems to have been eliminated as a requirement of the plaintiff's case by
the Supreme Court's decision in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128
(1972).
87. Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 783-84 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965); Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D. 553, 558(D. Md. 1971); Baumel v. Rosen, 283
F. Supp. 128 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd as to liability without discussion of this point, 412 F.2d
571 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970). See also Johns Hopkins Univ. v.
Hutton, 326 F. Supp. 250, 261 (D. Md. 1971) (which also discusses time limitation on
asking for rescission). See generally Schulman, Statutes of Limitations In 10b-5 Actions:
Complication Added to Confusion, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 635 (1967).
In Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, the complainant alleged that the facts constituted
a violation of rule 10b-5 as well as other provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 which
carry specific limitation provisions. The plaintiff obtained a summary judgement based
on these other claims [297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968)] but the judgement was reversed
and the case was sent back since the appeals court found that there was a substantial
question for trial as to whether the specific limitation period should be applied [422 F.2d
1126 (4th Cir. 1970)]. On re-trial plaintiff again obtained a summary judgment, based
this time on rule 10b-5 [326 F. Supp. 250 (D. Md. 1971)], and a second appeal was taken,
which has been argued but not yet decided.
88. MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 34(e) (1971).
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the applicable statute in Maryland."9 This section has a limita-
tion period of one year after discovery of the untrue statement or
omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, but not more than three years
after the contract of sale.9"
Likewise, the expiration of a reasonable period after discov-
ery of the fraud, or of key facts leading to such discovery, would
ordinarily call for the application of laches.9' The established
Maryland rule on laches, however, has consistently required a
change of position by the defendant as well as passage of time,
to invoke the doctrine.92 The federal rule appears to be similar.93
A special application of the standard of diligence to the
plaintiff's conduct lies in the field of limitations and laches. The
case of Holmberg v. Armbrecht,"4 decided by the Supreme Court
in 1946, established that where a state statute of limitations
would ordinarily be applied to the enforcement of a federal right
in equity, the federal court will not bar the suit due to mere lapse
of time and that "where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and
'remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence
or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run
until the fraud is discovered. . . .'"I' This principle has been
regularly applied in suits in equity based on violations of rule 10b-
5, which does not contain or refer to any specific limitation pe-
riod, and the "equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute
of limitation."96 Dealing with laches, the Supreme Court also
said:
Equity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on flexibil-
ity. Equity has acted on the principle that 'laches is not like
limitation, a mere matter of time; but principally a question
of the inequity of permitting the claim to be enforced-an
inequity founded upon some change in the condition or rela-
tions of the property or the parties.' . . . And so, a suit in
89. See Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D. 553 (D. Md. 1971), applying Maryland's
prior two year statute of limitations.
90. MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 34(e) (1971).
91. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
92. Arundel Supply Corp. v. Carson, 265 Md. 371, 289 A.2d 585 (1972).
93. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946); Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp.
128 (D. Md. 1968), afl'd, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969). See generally Comment,
Applicability of Waiver, Estoppel, and Laches Defenses to Private Suits Under the Securi-
ties Act and S.E.C. Rule 10b-5, 73 YALE L.J. 1477 (1964).
94. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
95. Id. at 397.
96. Id.
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equity may lie though a comparable cause of action at law
would be barred."
In Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith" possible defenses of
laches, waiver and estoppel were recognized. The plaintiff was a
substantial investor and became president of the company but
complained of an earlier income projection which ignored land
costs; he also complained of non-disclosure of the company's dis-
pute with a former president. The defenses were, however, not
sustained on trial and the plaintiff recovered.99 In another case a
defense of unclean hands was sustained. The plaintiff was a tip-
pee who sought recovery from those who had made a further profit
under prompting of the same tip. He was found by the court to
be in pari delicto.00
In Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine,'01 the plaintiff, a
broker, sued another brokerage house for falsely recommending
a customer as a good credit risk, claiming that it suffered large
losses by accepting checks of the customer in extensive stock
market transactions. The facts established that the plaintiff had
accepted checks on this recommendation previously, and the cus-
tomer had defaulted, but after delay had cured the default. This,
according to the court, relieved the defendant of any possible
liability, since the plaintiff had again accepted checks after this
experience. The loss was therefore due in large part to the plain-
tiff's own conduct.
A leading case in the Fourth Circuit, Baumel v. Rosen, 02 held
that the remedy of rescission can be lost through delay in making
demand. While the plaintiff must act promptly after discovery of
the fraud in order to preserve his full right of rescission, the bur-
den rests on the defendant to prove plaintiff's knowledge and the
timing of such knowledge. 103
Assuming that there is no fiduciary relationship, it would
seem that ordinarily a release entered into with full knowledge of
the facts would be enforced. Where, however, a release is obtained
without full disclosure of material facts known to the defendant,
97. Id. at 396.
98. 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962). The court there recognized that the defenses of
laches, waiver and estoppel were permissible under section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
99. Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1964), affirming the
district court's decision on re-trial.
100. Kuehnart v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
101. 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970).
102. 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1969).
103. See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 343 F. Supp. 245, 259-61 (D. Md. 1972).
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it is difficult to perceive why it should defeat an action otherwise
maintainable under the rule.'"4 In a case in which the releasee
occupies a fiduciary position to the releasor, the release can be
sustained under Maryland law only if the releasor had "knowl-
edge of all relevant facts," and the releasee has the burden of
establishing "the perfect fairness, adequacy and equity" of the
transaction. 05
The effect of section 29(a) of the Exchange Act, invalidating
any waiver of rights under the Act,0 6 has been the subject of
numerous decisions, including several as to the validity of re-
leases and arbitration clauses.'"7 In Schine v. Schine, °5 a long-
continued proceeding in the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, the court sustained a complaint which dis-
closed and sought to avoid a detailed form of release and recital
signed by the plaintiff. The district court in that case made the
following comment: "It would be at least highly anomalous...
to hold under § 29(a) that a party, without knowing the facts,
could effectively bar himself by a release from suing for fraud in
the transaction of which the release was part."'00
Unlike the defenses of limitations and laches, discussed pre-
viously, which placed a certain obligation on the plaintiff to in-
vestigate and bring an action within a reasonable period of time
after the discovery of the fraud, there is no requirement placed
upon the plaintiff that he search out possible fraud before enter-
ing into the transaction. Quite the opposite is true; no reported
case to date has held that the defrauded party must, at his peril,
investigate whether the defendant has violated the standard set
forth in rule 10b-5 (or section 13 of the Maryland Securities Act),
absent any indication that there may have been such a violation.
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland, in
a case involving a recognized fiduciary obligation of the defen-
dant to the plaintiff, has held that the burden of disclosure and
explanation must necessarily rest upon the defendant under the
express terms of the rule as well as the uniform holdings of the
courts."10
104. Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 268 (1st Cir. 1966) (semble).
105. See note 38 supra.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (a) (1970). This subsection provides: "Any condition, stipula-
tion, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of [the
statute or regulations thereunder] . . . shall be void." Id.
107. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 8, at 1812-17, supplemented in 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 3932-38 (Supp. 1969).
108. 254 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
109. Id. at 988.
110. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 343 F. Supp. 245, 259 (D. Md. 1972). There
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It should be noted, however, that where the defrauded party
is put on notice as to any facts which are "calculated to excite
inquiry," the courts have said that the plaintiff cannot go forward
with the transaction without further investigation and later claim
to have been defrauded.'" Where, however, there has been no
such fact brought to the attention of the plaintiff prior to entering
into the transaction, the courts have not placed an affirmative
burden upon the plaintiff to search out possible fraud.
Measure of Damages
The accounting to which an injured buyer is entitled by way
of damages is relatively simple. If he acts promptly on discovery
and tenders the securities purchased, he is ordinarily entitled to
rescission and recovery of the full purchase price."' This appears
to constitute a ceiling on the damages which an injured buyer
may receive. If rescission is not permitted, or if the buyer retains
the securities purchased, his recovery is the amount by which his
payment for the securities exceeded their then value."' In other
words, the injured buyer is entitled to be "made whole" but can
recover no profit on the transaction.
The damages recoverable by an injured seller are, in the
Judge Kaufman cites Pence v. Langdon, 99 U.S. 578 (1878), for his conclusion that the
burden of proof on this aspect of the case rests upon the defendant.
111. Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971). In Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963), a case
which enunciates many of the principles set forth herein, the Seventh Circuit analyzed
the non-disclosures of which the plaintiff complained and the statements given or made
accessible to him as a former director active in management, and concluded that no
material facts were kept from him. But it also emphasized that the "plaintiff was intent
on selling his stock [ten percent of a large national manufacturing company] in as short
a time as possible" and that the "sale was accomplished ... in less than three weeks-an
abbreviated period directly attributable to the near-urgent negotiation timetable set by
plaintiff." Id. at 638.
City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905
(1970), involved a 10b-5 counterclaim against a plaintiff bank which had no connection
with the purchase and sale but had loaned money to the counterclaiming investors who,
as the court found, had access to "all the books and records" of the corporation in ques-
tion. The court treated the investors as insiders and denied the claim on several grounds,
citing its earlier and leading case of Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), for the
conclusion that "there is no duty to disclose information to one who reasonably should
already be aware of it. Nor is there the necessity for one insider to 'search out details' for
another insider." 422 F.2d at 231.
112. See Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Royal Air Properties, Inc.
v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1964). See also Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.)
(dictum), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). The general discussion of damages in this case
was approved by the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128 (1972).
113. See Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 872 (1965).
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usual case where the other party has made a profit on the securi-
ties purchased, subject to a different principle, and may involve
complex calculations due to the presumed breach of fiduciary
duty on the part of the insider-purchaser. The essence of the rule
is that the so-called fraudulent party is not permitted to retain
the profits which he has made through the wrongful acquisition
of the plaintiff's securities. Such profit is recoverable in full by
the plaintiff."4
This rule of damages was adopted by the Fourth Circuit in
Baumel v. Rosen."5 In that case, however, the court carefully
considered the facts as to discovery of the fraud by the plaintiff
and determined that additional profits accruing to the defendant
after the plaintiff knew that he had been defrauded should not
be recoverable, as the right to full rescission had been lost by
delay for an unreasonable time after such discovery. The damages
as finally determined and awarded included the increase in mar-
ket value of the securities to that date but not thereafter. 6
Further questions as to rescissional damages recoverable by
a defrauded plaintiff-seller may be presented in cases involving
unusual facts. For example, if the fraudulent purchaser has com-
mingled the securities purchased with other securities owned by
him, and has sold the package as an entirety, what effect would
this have on the recovery by the plaintiff?"7 In several cases the
plaintiff has obtained relief in the form of a decree for an account-
ing without an immediate determination of the amount of dam-
ages to be awarded."' It is suggested that in complex cases such
114. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), where the Court
approved and adopted the rules stated in Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 872 (1965). The Supreme Court stated the damage rule in the following
language:
The correct measure of damages . . . is the difference between the fair value of all
that the . . . seller received and the fair value of what he would have received had
there been no fraudulent conduct . . . except for the situation where the defendant
received more than the seller's actual loss. In the latter case damages are the
amount of the defendant's profit.
406 U.S. at 155 (emphasis added).
115. 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1969).
116. Whether the Supreme Court would approve this limitation on its rule, which
would in fact permit the defrauding party to retain a substantial part of his wrongful gain,
appears to be open to argument in future litigation reaching the Court.
117. See notes 119-28 infra and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Kane v. Central Am. Mineral & Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). In Speed v.
Transamerica Corp., 135 F. Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955), the damages were determined in a
separate hearing nearly four years after liability had been ruled to exist.
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a procedure might result in a more equitable solution than an
attempt to fix the damages at the trial on the question of liability.
Valuation Problems
The broad principle has been previously stated that a seller
injured by violation of rule 10b-5 is, in general, entitled to recover
from the buyer the entire profit made by him on the securities
wrongfully acquired from the plaintiff. It is now intended to ex-
plore briefly the question whether principles of tracing trust funds
misappropriated by a fiduciary are applicable in such a case. No
case decided under rule 10b-5 appears to have considered this
question and it must therefore be dealt with from the standpoints
of analogy, and of consideration of the reasoning of the courts
expressed in the so-called tracing cases.
The general equitable doctrine of tracing trust funds is well
recognized in Maryland and has been applied in a number of
cases, both state and federal. A statement in Englar v. Offutt,19
quoted by Chief Judge Parker of the Fourth Circuit in MacBryde
v. Burnett,'20 states the rule broadly in this language: "[Ijf a
trustee or fiduciary mixes trust funds with his own, the whole will
be treated as trust property, except so far as he may be able to
distinguish what is his from that which belongs to the
trust .. ."I21
The fiduciary duty of controlling persons in a corporation,
under Maryland law, has been explored generally, and the point
has been suggested that directors and officers, who are also
controlling stockholders, are by the present general weight of au-
thority recognized to be fiduciaries in their relationship to minor-
ity stockholders. Such directors, even if not in a controlling posi-
tion, are seemingly, by the Maryland court, and by a number of
other state courts, regarded as owing a fiduciary duty to individ-
ual stockholders with whom they deal in the purchase or sale of
stock of the corporation.
In MacBryde the Fourth Circuit had before it an appeal from
a decision of the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland which considered the question whether the trustee had
been guilty of a breach of trust, invoking the rules applicable to
tracing of misapplied trust funds in altered form. While both
courts found that the trustee had not violated the fiduciary stan-
119. 70 Md. 78, 16 A. 497 (1889).
120. 132 F.2d 898 (4th Cir. 1942).
121. Id. at 900.
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dard in the acts charged, the Fourth Circuit's opinion carefully
analyzed the doctrine of tracing under the Maryland law. It
stated:
It is well settled that, if trust funds are mingled with per-
sonal funds of a trustee, the whole is impressed with a trust
until separation of the trust property can be made, and that
the trust is entitled to a proportionate part of the profits
realized by the trustee in dealing with the fund in which the
trust funds are mingled. And it is not necessary in asserting
the rights of the cestui que trust that the trust funds be
specifically traced. It is sufficient that they have been used
by the trustee to augment a fund upon which profits have
been realized.'
In Corbett v. Hospelhorn,13 the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land stated that where a trustee by wrongful disposition of trust
property acquires other property, the beneficiary is entitled to
enforce a constructive trust on the property so acquired by the
trustee. 14 The broad scope of the doctrine as recognized in Mary-
land is stated in Thomas C. Basshor Co. v. Carrington,'25 a 1906
decision, that the doctrine permitting trust property to be fol-
lowed and recovered in equity is applicable in all cases of a fidu-
ciary relationship or quasi-trust.1 21
If, therefore, it is recognized, as it must be, that under appl-
icable Maryland law one who violates his fiduciary responsibility
(as well as the applicable rule 10b-5) in acquiring securities of a
minority stockholder in his corporation, holds these securities in
trust, it seems difficult to discern any ground for failure to apply
the established remedies in such cases called the tracing of trust
funds. The general principles for application of these rules appear
to be met, and the juridical statements which have been quoted
indicate no ground for excepting the 10b-5 cases from full applica-
tion of the doctrine. 27
In Weatherby v. Weatherby Lumber Co. ,125 decided in 1972
122. Id.
123. 172 Md. 257, 191 A. 691 (1937).
124. Id. at 275, 191 A. at 699.
125. 104 Md, 606, 65 A. 360 (1906).
126. Id. at 629-30, 65 A. at 362-63.
127. The author acknowledges that because of the pendency of litigation by his firm
in which these questions may be involved, he cannot claim a totally disinterested impar-
tiality for the opinion here expressed; however, the aforementioned notwithstanding, it is
strongly felt that this is a correct statement of the law.
128. 94 Idaho 504, 492 P.2d 43 (1972).
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by the Idaho Supreme Court, a somewhat similar tracing problem
developed, although the case was decided entirely under state law
and with no reference to rule 10b-5. By state law Idaho had in
earlier cases recognized a fiduciary duty of a controlling stock-
holder, who was the president of his corporation, toward other
stockholders. In Weatherby, the president of the Weatherby
Company bought the stock of certain minority holders without
disclosing a pending but not finalized offer of an outside corpora-
tion to purchase the entire company, together with another com-
pany which the president owned solely, for a lump sum price. The
court held that the president was liable to the minority for the
profit he made on their stock (for a proper apportionment of the
total purchase price which he received). This, appears to be a
direct application of the principles governing the tracing of trust
funds.
A further question was presented in Weatherby as to appor-
tionment of the purchase price, since the allocation on the books
of the companies was claimed by the plaintiffs to have been un-
fairly made on the basis of incorrect book values. The appeals
court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a supplementary
hearing on damages to have the respective book values revised,
if it could be shown that they were not computed in accordance
with the actual facts and proper accounting principles.
CONCLUSION
In a general review of the scope of the anti-fraud provisions
found in securities law one immediately recognizes a similarity
between the rules developed in the state common law cases,
which stress fiduciary obligations of controlling stockholders, and
those developed in federal cases relying upon rule 10b-5. In
connection with this similarity the federal courts have developed
a relative freedom to apply both state law and federal statutory
remedies for the solution of securities related problems. With
these observations in mind several concluding comments on the
area of securities law may be ventured.
First, the development and application of rule 10b-5 cuts
across and overshadows, in cases where it is applicable, the du-
ties, obligations and remedies which have developed in the state
common law cases, particularly those dealing with the effect of
fiduciary obligations. However, the common law actions should
not be ignored. Both the increased burden of proof placed upon
a fiduciary to justify the fairness of his conduct and the remedies
available to a defrauded party through the common law should
be kept in mind when a securities fraud suit is initiated.
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Secondly, complementing rule 10b-5, and supplementing the
common law fraud actions, are the state securities acts. These
state laws should, as far as possible, be assimilated to those pro-
tections available under rule 10b-5. This should be done so that
the same legal principles may be applied regardless of the
amounts involved and where the suit is initiated. With this goal
in mind, it is immediately recognized and recommended that
section 34 of the Maryland Securities Act be amended to provide
a civil remedy for injured sellers of securities as well as injured
buyers.
The long-stated aim of the anti-fraud securities laws and
rules, to equalize the bargaining power of the parties to securities
transctions, can perhaps never be fully realized; however, this
remains a goal toward which the courts, the regulatory and legis-
lative bodies, legal students and the bar can persistently devote
their joint efforts.
